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CONTRACTS - ARBITRATION AND AWARD -VALIDITY AT COMMON LAW
OF PROCEEDINGS Voro UNDER ARBITRATION STATUTES - Defendant contracted with plaintiff to grade an athletic field. The contract required all questions subject to arbitration thereunder to be submitted to statutory arbitration at
the choice of either party. A dispute arose and at the plaintiff's demand three
arbitrators were selected as provided in the contract. Plaintiff sued to collect
an award granted in his favor. Defendant objected that both the contract of
submission and the proceedings fell far short of the statutory requirements. Held,
though the parties agreed to arbitrate under the statute, the proceedings pursuant
to the contract fell so far short of statutory requirements that it may be presumed that the parties intended common-law arbitration; as such, the proceedings were valid, and an action on the award must succeed. Park Construction Co. v. lndependent School District No. 32, Carver County, (Minn. 1941)

296 N. W. 475.
While the principal case raises several important issues,1 this note will be
limited to an examination of the question of the validity at common law of
proceedings void under arbitration statutes. The majority of the court bases
its decision on a provision of the arbitration statute to the effect that nothing in
the statute should be interpreted as taking away the right to common-law
arbitration. 2 The court thus overrules an earlier case, decided under an identical
but prior statute,3 to the effect that, though the parties had the right to contract
for common-law arbitration, proceedings pursuant to, but not conforming to, the
arbitration statute would not be upheld by the court as valid at common law.4
The opinion in the principal case was rendered on the assumption that the
prior statute did not contain the mentioned provision. On a petition for a rehearing, it was pointed out to the court that the prior statute was identical, and
that its re-enactment should be taken by the court as an affirmance of the court
decisions rendered thereunder. 5 The court denied the petition, stating no
1 One of the more important issues in the case concerns the validity at common
law of a contract which submits all matters including liability to arbitration. At common law such a contract would be void as an attempt to oust the courts of their jurisdiction. The minority argued that such is still the rule in Minnesota, and therefore
even if the contract in the principal case could be held to be a submission at common
law, it is void since it submits all matters to arbitration. The majority answered by
expressly overruling all prior Minnesota cases in which such contracts have been held
void.
Another issue was discussed by the minority only. From the facts it appeared
that at the time the dispute arose plaintiff suggested a common-law arbitration. Defendant flatly rejected this proposal and insisted on arbitration as provided for in the
contract. The minority argued that if the contract can be interpreted to be a submission to common-law arbitration, the defendant's refusal operated as a revocation of
submission. At common law a revocation was within the power of either party until
the rendition of an award.
2 Minn. Stat. (Mason, 192 7), § 9 5 l 3: "nothing herein shall preclude the arbitration of controversies according to the common law."
8
Minn. Gen. Stat. (1878), c. 89.
4
Holdridge v. Stowell, 39 Minn. 360, 40 N. W. 259 (1888).
5 The re-enactment of a statute after construction of the statute by the court is an
adoption of such construction, and gives it the force of law. Christgau v. Woodlawn
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reasons for the order. Previously, the court had accepted the reasoning supported by the weight of authority in this country: 6 that common-law arbitration
is entirely independent of statutory arbitration; 7 that the rights secured to the
parties under statutory proceedings 8 might have been the sole inducement causing the parties to submit to arbitration rather than resorting to court action; that
a statutory submission cannot be treated as a submission at common law without
annulling the actual contract of the parties and substituting a different one
which might be completely contrary to their intent.9 Prior to the principal case
only three courts have advanced contrary reasoning: that upon a submission to
statutory arbitration, the intent to arbitrate is alone material and the mode
selected is inconsequential; that if the parties intend to submit to arbitration, but
mistake the law and fail to achieve a valid statutory proceeding, they should not
be prevented from carrying out their intent in some other manner; that to compel them to litigate what they expressly desired to avoid litigating is to discourage amicable settlements.10 The dissenting justice in the case points out that
though the majority opinion does not expressly contain this line of reasoning, it
must be based thereon, since a statutory provision preserving the right to common-law arbitration ( even assuming the provision to be an innovation in the
present statute) is hardly a legislative declaration that every assent to statutory
proceedings is, by inclusion, consent to common-law proceedings as well.11 The
majority of the court would seem to ignore the fact that an agreement to submit to arbitration is a choice, not merely between two remedies, civil action or
arbitration, but between three: civil action, statutory arbitration, and commonlaw arbitration.12 The decision constitutes, therefore, a direct impairment of
Cemetery Assn., 208 Minn. 263, 293 N. W. 619 (1940); Wenger v. Wenger, 200
Minn. 436, 274 N. W. 517 (1937).
6
3 AM. JuR. 839 (1936).
7 Williams v. Walton, 9 Cal. 142 (1858); Franks v. Battles, 147 Ark. 169, 227
s. w.8 32 (1921).
For example: supervision by the court; arbitrators and witnesses sworn; award
may be set aside as contrary to law or evidence. See Holdridge v. Stowell, 39 Minn.
360, 40 N. W. 259 (1888); Benjamin v. Benjamin, 5 W. & S. (Pa.) 562 (1843);
Sargent v. Inhabitants of Hampden, 32 Me. 78 (1850).
9
Deerfield v. Arms, 37 Mass. 480 (1838); Sargent v. Inhabitants of Hampden,
32 Me. 78 (1850).
10
Galloway v. Gibson, 51 Mich. 135, 16 N. W. 310 (1883); Darling v.
Darling, 16 Wis. 675 (1863); Wells v. Lain, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 99 (1835). It
should be noted that the statutes under which the New York and Wisconsin cases were
decided differ from the Minnesota statute in that they state that no provision of the
statute shall be construed as taking away the right to an action on any award rendered
under the statute. See 3 N. Y. Rev. Stat., 6th ed., part 3, tit. 14, c. 8, p. 846, § 22
(1875).
11 Conger v. Dean, 3 Iowa 463 (1856): the purpose of such a provision is to
make the statutory mode nonexclusive. See Ann. Cas. 1913D 203; 2 CoNTRACTS
RESTATEMENT, § 445, comment c (1932).
12 Several cases have gone so far as to declare that the choice is a binding election
barring the parties from resort to one of the other modes. Allen v. Chase, 3 Wis. 249
(1854); Francis v. Ames, 14 Ind. 251 (1860). See also MoRsE, ARBITRATION AND
AWARD 47-48 (1872), for a discussion of the applicability of an election doctrine in
such a case.
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the remedial obligations of the main contract.18 It might be argued that since
at the present time the statutory mode is more widely known than the commonlaw method, a stipulation for statutory arbitration merely indicates the desire
to arbitrate, rather than a selection between the two modes. 14 However, even
should this presumption be tenable, it would seem that it should be rebuttable
by proof that the rights secured under the statute were the prime elements in
inducing the parties to give assent to the arbitration agreement.

Edward H. Schlaudt

13 That is, when the parties assented to the contract they assented to one of the
three remedies. The effect of this line of reasoning is to impair the obligation thus
created. To the effect that impairment of remedy is impairment of contract obligation
within the meaning of Art. I, § IO of the Federal Constitution, see Home Bldg. &
Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 54 S. Ct. 231 (1933). To the effect that the
obligation of a contract may be impaired by a denial of a remedy by judicial action, see
Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 50 S. Ct. 451 (1929).
14 lt is not even claimed that such a reason is one on which a court could formally
base its decision. Rather it is suggested as a possible reason for the reversal of the
Holdridge case (note 4, supra), which was decided in 1888, when the common-law
method of arbitration was possibly more widely known than the statutory method.

